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Abstract
In 1978 China initiated its policy of ‘reform and opening’, and began the
transition from a planned to a market economy. Since then, the government has
recognized the need for a private and voluntary sector to help deal with the social
consequences of the market reforms. The government has consequently been
transferring some of its functions to an increasing number of so called
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Some observers see this trend as
evidence of an emerging civil society, and look at this development as in the end
leading to democracy. Others are more pessimistic.
This thesis examines this development and aims to explore the degree of
autonomy that this new group of Chinese NGOs enjoys in relation to the state.
The result is somewhat inconclusive. The Chinese society is becoming
increasingly pluralistic and new arenas for participation are opened up as the state
withdraws. At the same time, the government is still exercising a firm control on
society and NGOs. Still, evidence suggests that there actually exists a larger space
for autonomy than what might appear at a first glance.
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11. Introduction
1.1 Background
China´s policy of ‘reform and opening’, a unique model for development during
the post-Mao era, has meant an economic liberalization without hardly any
political democratization. This model has been referred to as perestroika without
glasnost. It involves thorough economical reforms, such as the making of special
economic zones, the semi-privatization of the agriculture, the allowing of private
enterprise and the selling out of state-owned small- and medium-sized enterprises,
deregulation of prices, the introduction of a stock market, etc. The economic
achievements speak for themselves, but on the political side few progresses have
been made. As economic freedom poses new challenges for the regime the
government is taking measures to maintain its control. Some hail the capitalistic
revolution and mean that the reforms, however, will eventually lead to political
democratization. Others hold a more pessimistic view and claims that no real
democratizations have been made and are not likely to occur in the near future
either. Basically, as Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen say, ”optimists would
examine a Starbucks in Shanghai, find two intellectuals having a conversation,
and proclaim, ’Eureka! They´re following our road to democracy!’ Pessimists, by
contrast, would lament: ’They´re discussing the best way to make money in
China´s new economy – not politics. China will never democratize!’” (Gries &
Rosen, 2004, p. 4). Officially the government is pursuing a socialistic politic with
Chinese characteristics.
Another related issue is China´s emerging civil society and its key role in the
development towards pluralism and democracy, and at the bottom of this lie the
changing relations between state and society. As the market economy expands and
the reach of the state shrinks, new arenas for participation are opened up, and
many services that were earlier provided by the state today rely completely on
private entrepreneurs. New needs also create a variety of new types of services,
and this has partly given rise to a new phenomenon in China: the emergence of
NGOs.
Whatever view one holds on these issues, Chinese society has without doubt
gone through, and is going through, enormous changes. These changes are worth
examining.
1.2 Purpose and Question
I will in this work discuss civil society in China, and I will be focusing on the
relation between state and society. My main purpose is to examine the emergence
2of NGOs in China, and decide how autonomous these organizations really are and
how they are working to become more so. My question for this thesis thus is: How
autonomous are NGOs in China in relation to the state, and are they autonomous
enough to carry out functions normally attributed civil society?
1.3 Theory and Operationalization
1.3.1 Operationalization of civil society
The concept of civil society is one of the most debated in the field of political
science. The views differ on matters such as what to include in civil society and
what to exclude, what are the preconditions for it and what are the effects. It is
often described as a residual sector, where everything that is non-state and non-
market is grouped together. We will, however, need to make some kind of
definition in order to use the concept in an analysis.
When we speak about democracy movements we generally define them as part
of civil society. But these democracy movements can often appear as if from
nowhere and are hard to detect before the defining moment. Hence, I would say,
there is a social capital that is activated and formed into civil society. But social
capital, defined as a feature of social relations (Chandhoke 2004, p. 157) is very
hard to measure, and this makes the definition of civil society much more
complicated, as a social capital may very well exist without it being recognized as
part of civil society. Most observers when defining civil society implicitly refer to
the actions as being, or not being, part of civil society, rather than groups. My
opinion is that a person who is not satisfied with his or her situation and therefore
joins in protestings against the present regime, thus participating in a ”democracy
movement”, is not necessarily a part of civil society. It is crucial to make this
distinction between actions and groups (that may however represent a specific
type of action). This is not because I perceive the value in importance and
implications of these spontaneous actions to be necessarily less than that of
organized groups, but simply because they are not easily defined, and are blunt
tools in an analysis. Therefore I shall limit my scope for analysis in this study to
organized groups and associations, widely defined as nongovernmental
organizations, or NGOs. Another reason for my choice to focus on NGOs, is that
these organizations are undoubtedly the most powerful tools through which the
Chinese people today may participate in public affairs and make their voices
heard.
If there is one thing that most political scientists agree on, it’s that some kind of
civil society is needed for any real democratizations to be made (even though they
may argue that a depolitization and a demobilization of society must be made
after the transition), and that NGOs are playing a key role in this civil society. It is
a basic hypothesis that the emergence of autonomous NGOs, associations and
institutions will stimulate popular demands for autonomy, and in the long run lead
to democracy. ”That is what happened in Europe” (Wank 1995, p. 56).
3We also have to make a further distinction between the many different types of
NGOs that exist. This is of particular importance when discussing authoritarian
regimes such as China. Neera Chandhoke comments that whatever definition we
chose, civil society is ”definitely de-linked from the state and in some cases from
the market” (Chandhoke 2004, p. 149). Using a society-centered western concept
of civil society like the one referred to by Chandhoke, or the one offered by
Gordon White (White 2004, p. 10), narrowly defining it as working against the
state, will, however, be fruitless in any attempt to discuss the case of China. The
interactions between state and society are simply to complex to be separated from
each other, and are at the same time taking place within a framework that is
provided by the state. NGOs may include a broad range of social institutions such
as trade associations, foundations, environmental organizations, professional
organizations, academic associations, women´s right organizations, chambers of
commerce, schools, homes for the elderly, hospitals, etc. The ideal may very well
be for these to be operating outside the state and the market, but the number and
importance of those that are not is in this case to great to be ignored.
On the other hand, applying a strict state-led model, describing any civil
society activism as completely created and managed by the state, would be to
simplistic. The Chinese society is too big and complex for the government to
handle, and as Wu Fengshi argues there are “unintended consequences even when
the state does create societal groups and set up NGOs” (generally labeled as
government organized NGOs, or GONGOs) (Wu 2003, ”The Good Society”, p.
35).
Another common way to describe civil society is to make the distinction
between economic, cultural and political civil society. Since I will make some use
of this categorization I will make a brief outline of what this refers to. Economic
civil society refers to “productive and commercial associations and networks”.
Cultural civil society covers “intellectual, religious, ethnic, communal, and other
institutions that defend collective rights, values, faiths, beliefs, and symbols”.
Political civil society refers to “free and autonomous opposition groups or
associations seeking in a non-partisan fashion to improve the political system
through human rights monitoring, voter education, and mobilization, anti-
corruption efforts, and so on” (He 1997, p. 7). Nongovernmental organizations,
the core of civil society, are found in all three of these areas, and its important to
make a distinction because the dissemination might not be even and autonomy
mostly concentrated in some areas.
I will thus not limit myself to a specific model or concept of civil society in
deciding which types of NGOs to include or to exclude. I will rather make a
categorization of the different types of NGOs that exist, and seek to understand
the nature of these as well as their relation to the state. The two main types of
NGOs that I will use are: registered NGOs and government organized NGOs
(GONGOs). I will also use the term unregistered NGOs, since this is a significant
group, both in size and importance.
41.3.2 A Definition of NGOs and Their Role in Civil Society
There are many different definitions of an NGO, some of them are rather wide
concepts, while other are more narrow and exclude all organizations which are not
completely autonomous and self-governing. Professor Lester Salamon, a leading
scholar on NGOs, of Johns Hopkins University, identifies five common
characteristics of NGOs: they are (1) organized – they have an institutional
presence and structure; (2) private – they are institutionally separate from the
state; (3) non-profit distributing – they do not return profits to their managers or
‘owners’; (4) self-governing – they are fundamentally in control of their own
affairs; and (5) voluntary – membership in them is not legally required and they
attract voluntary contributions of time or money (Zhang 2003, p. 3). Most Chinese
NGOs will certainly not live up to these norms, nor will all NGOs in Western
countries, but this categorization gives us good standards against which to
measure Chinese NGOs. As I said, I won´t ‘decide’ on a definition for which
NGOs to study, but rather try and see where autonomy is found and what the
chances for NGOs that measure up to Salamon´s criteria to emerge are.
In the literature on civil society non-governmental organizations are attributed
a number of functions that are supposed to be beneficial to the society at large.
For example, Neera Chandhoke states that when we define civil society as NGOs,
we are conceptualizing them as ”providers of services and upholders of
democracy” (Chandhoke 2004, p. 149). I will thus distinguish between two main
functions that NGOs are supposed to carry out in civil society. The first one is to
benefit the public and the second to monitor the state.
1.3.3 Operationalization of Autonomy
Autonomy is by many scholars seen as the most important characteristic of an
NGO. As already stated, NGOs constitute an essential part of civil society, and in
order to carry out civil society functions, NGOs have to have a certain amount of
autonomy. How can we then decide the degree of autonomy enjoyed by NGOs in
China? There is really no yes-or-no question for us to ask. As White, Howell and
Shang put it, ”the extent to which a specific social organization embodies the
defining qualities of ’civil society’ – autonomy, separation and voluntariness – is
a question of degree, rather than either/or” (White et al. 1996, p. 6).
Since there is no scale for us to use, I will rather have to make some sort of
check list and see to what degree organizations in China compare to the criteria
set up in this. Julie Fisher, a scholar on NGOs in the third world, makes a list of
seven keys to organizational autonomy. She states that there is a contradiction
between the demand for autonomy on the one side and the call for accountability
on the other, and that it might appear that “the more successful NGOs are in
achieving multiple accountability, the less autonomous they become”. She means
that accountability is preferred downwards, while the meaning of autonomy
should be confined to what might be called upward relationships (and not e.g.
autonomy from the constituents) (Fisher 1998, p. 78). The seven keys to
organizational autonomy that she identifies are:
51 .  Organizational commitment (With organizational commitment Fisher
means that NGOs need a clear, self-conscious commitment to autonomy).
2. Financial diversification (NGOs need to receive their funding from many
different sources, especially in Third World countries where philanthropic
traditions are weak).
3 .  A mass base (NGOs need to have strong grassroots ties, which, in
combination with financial diversification, will secure the survival of an
NGO during repressive and unfavorable times).
4 .  Technical expertise (number 4, 5 and 6 are three related kinds of
knowledge that will enhance the autonomy of grassroots support
organizations (GRSOs)).
5. Social and managerial knowledge.
6. Strategic knowledge.
7 .  Staff experience in training government workers (NGO-government
partnership in project implementation may lead to either increased
autonomy or increased dependency, and autonomy is most likely to be
strengthened when NGOs train government personnel).
I will use Fisher´s criteria in my work here, but I will be focusing more on some
of the listed keys to autonomy and less on others. Especially useful will be
‘financial diversification’ and ‘organizational commitment’. I will also make
some use of ‘a mass base’ and ‘staff experience’, while it will be more difficult
for me to say something about ‘technical expertise’, ‘social and managerial
knowledge’, and ‘strategic knowledge’ (which I also consider to be of lesser
importance than the others for deciding the degree of autonomy). I will however
also consider the legal framework as a key to organizational autonomy, including
registration procedures, legal status, and rules and regulations for NGOs.
It would be feasible to think that organizations with a weak relation to the
government are more autonomous than those that are closely linked to it. Fisher
does not make such a final statement, but instead argues that autonomy can
actually be gained in working with the government. She bases her work mainly on
countries in the third world that are democratic, or at least not as authoritarian as
China. So, dealing with China, I would still make the hypothesis that autonomy
increases as the relation with the government weakens. I also hypothesize that
autonomy will be found the most in organizations working in the area we defined
as economic civil society, and the least in so called political civil society.
1.4 Structure and Method
I will in this study take a look at the condition of civil society in China, through
the analyzing of the emerging NGO sector and its autonomy from the state.
6I´ll begin with a quick overview of civil society in China as a field of study, and
the different theories on Chinese society that have emerged as a result. This will
help to put the later discussion of NGOs in a larger perspective and offers a frame
of reference for the reader on how to understand civil society in China.
Then, I will go on to focus on the actual emergence of NGOs in China, the
different types that can be discerned, their relation to the state, and the
implications that this phenomenon has for the communist regime and the Chinese
society at large (the implications might be only briefly mentioned and further
elaborated on at the end of the paper). A part that discusses the problems that
NGOs are facing will also be natural here.
A major part will be dedicated to analyzing the degree of autonomy that
organizations enjoy vis-à-vis the state. Here, in the fourth part, I will be presenting
a number of examples of Chinese NGOs, and also apply some of the theories
described in the oprationalisation.
Finally, I will present my conclusions and make a general outlook, and also
give some suggestions for future research.
72. Civil Society in China as a Field of Study
Civil society in China is certainly a growing field of study, and has been so since
the events of 1989: the Tiananmen incident and the fall of the Berlin Wall in East
Europe. Much has been written in the field, and there are many different views on
the subject.
It has often been suggested that the concept of civil society cannot be applied
to the case of China, because the Chinese society is not autonomous from the
state. Robert Weatherley states that in the Chinese discourse on human rights the
emphasis has always been on the individual´s responsibilities and not it´s rights.
(Weatherley 1999, p. 10). This is of course a kind of thinking that does not easily
fit into the Western concept of civil society. Hegel went so far as to argue that
China is in fact a state without a society (Brook & Frolic 1997, p. 3).
Yet, China was considered to be at the forefront of the liberalization wave that
swept through parts of the communist world in the 1980´s, and the concept of
civil society was also applied to the case of China. Many observers compared the
situation in China with the one in Eastern Europe, and the expectations were high
that the political liberalizations during this period would also lead up to a real
democratization. In Europe, networks of autonomous organizations were created
in a space parallel to the state. They did not confront the state directly, but
”surrounded it with ’a wide spectrum of activities, from cultural and religious
organizations and human rights groups to independent economic activities ranging
from trade unions to private enterprises’” (Frolic 1997, p. 47). Similarities were
particularly found in the case of Hungary where economic reforms and private
business gave individuals independence from state control. (Wank 1995, p. 56;
see also Tong 1997). In fact, it is a commonly held view among scholars on civil
society that stabile economic growth leads to the emergence of autonomous
groups and organizations, and that civil society and the market are also mutually
reinforcing (Baker 2004, p. 64). In Europe civil society emerged in the eighteenth
century along with the industrial revolution. The market ”produced a civil society
in defense of property and mapped out an arena in which the bourgeoisie
struggled for power, redefining relations between state and society” (Brook &
Frolic 1997, p. 14). In ”Civil Society in China”, Timothy Brook and Michael
Frolic, in line with this thinking, poses the question why the Chinese booming
economy should not give rise to an autonomous civil society.
White, Howell and Shang speak of a ’dual dynamic’ in the emergence of a civil
society. The first is a ‘political dynamic’, which reflects the political tensions and
conflicts in a society, and civil society is in this sense take the form of a society
working against the state. The political dynamic has, according to White and his
colleagues, been in place during the whole post-revolutionary era, since 1949,
even though they don’t go as far as to claim that there has been an existing civil
society. The second dynamic of civil society is a ’market dynamic’, and in this
context civil society is a “consequence of a separation between state and society
resulting from the rise of a market economy” (White et al. 1996, p. 7). White also
8makes the comparison with Hungary and what Hungarian sociologists called a
’second society’ (ibid). Since the initiation of the 1978 reforms, both of these
dynamics have for the first time been in place. The development of civil society in
the post-1978 era should therefore be thought of as “a complex interplay between
these two sociopolitical dynamics”, and it is shifting the balance between state
and society in the latter´s favor. This process will accordingly ultimately push for
a transition towards political liberalization and in the end some form of
“democratic polity” (ibid: p. 9f).
There have also emerged theories that point out the weaknesses of Chinese
NGOs and ask if maybe this should be understood in the light of China´s history
and political culture. Lu Yiyi refers to various studies of China´s political culture
that have found several attributes that are not conducive to collective action and
civil society activism, such as “elitism, fatalism, and lack of cooperative spirit and
group solidarity” (Lu 2005, p. 6). Ma Qiusha points out that most NGO leaders
”do not see their objective in confronting the government or protecting the society
from the state. Rather, they see their mission as fulfilling their citizen
responsibility in collaborating with the government” (Ma 2005, p. 3). This brings
up questions regarding ’Asian values’ and if maybe organizational culture in
China is essentially different, and that the western concept of autonomous
organizations might not be applicable to the case of China. Lu recommends that
we be cautious when using Western concepts of nongovernmental organizations,
but also not to completely discard them, because “the existence of cultural traits
that are not conducive to civil society activism does not mean that such activism
cannot develop in China” (ibid). It would certainly be interesting to go deeper into
these questions, but that falls without the aim of this study.
Another debated issue is that of state-led civil society and state corporatism.
Michael Frolic introduces in “Civil Society in China” the notion of a state-led
civil society, which is created top-down, primarily to help the state govern, but
also to “co-opt and socialize potentially politically active elements in the
population” (Frolic 1997, p. 56). This civil society refers “to the hundreds of
thousands of social organizations and quasi-administrative units created by the
state to help it manage a complex and rapidly expanding economy and changing
society” (ibid: p. 48). This description does not accord with most concepts of civil
society, but Frolic wonders if this state corporatism actually might, in Asia, be
”the preferred space between state and society, rather than the conventional
western civil society” (ibid: p. 59). He concludes that what we see today in China
are two emerging civil society, and it is the state-led civil society that
predominates (ibid: p. 60).
93. The Emergence of NGOs
3.1 Types of NGOs
To make heads and tails of the NGO sector in China is certainly not easy and only
ten years ago it would have been nearly impossible. Very often it´s the relation to
the state that is confusing and hard to determine. In some cases the relation is
obvious, but more often it is not. The best way to establish whether an NGO is
”genuine” or linked to the state is to look at its legal status. If the organization is
registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) as a social organization or a
nongovernmental and non-commercial enterprise, it is usually considered an
NGO, and if it is registered with the Bureau of Industry and Commerce it is
considered a commercial entity. Those not registered at all are technically
considered illegal. (Zhang 2003, p. 3). Those that are called GONGOs
(government-organized NGOs) are usually not required to register at all. It should
however be noted that the name GONGO is itself very vague, and it includes
often both organizations that are actually created by the government, as well as
registered NGOs, which´s relations are still to intimate with the state for observers
to call them genuine NGOs.
Before 1998 there existed no clear regulations defining NGOs. Since the
establishment of the People´s Republic of China there have at three different times
been issued documents regarding the classification, registration and regulation of
organizations outside of the government system: in 1950, 1989 and 1998. Before
1998, all types of institutions and associations were grouped in the single category
‘social organizations’. Since there existed no private nonprofit organizations prior
to 1978, these were all basically membership associations. In the 1998
”Regulations of Registrations of Social Organizations” a new group,
nongovernmental and non-commercial enterprises (NGNCE), was created to
provide legal status for, and to effectively manage, the rapidly growing group of
private nonprofit service institutions. According to the new official classifications,
NGOs include two main categories: social organizations (SOs, shehui tuanti) and
nongovernmental and non-commercial enterprises (NGNCEs, minban fei qiye
danwei) (see figure 1).
In ”The regulations of registrations of social organizations”, the government
defines social organizations as ”nonprofit organizations that are voluntarily
founded by Chinese citizens for their common will and operated according to their
charters”. The NGNCEs are defined as ”social entities engaging in nonprofit
social service activities, and they are founded by for-profit or nonprofit
enterprises, social organizations, other social forces or individual citizens using
non state-owned property or funds”. (Ma 2003, p. 4). If we return to the definition
for NGOs offered at the onset of this study by Lester Salamon, (they are
organized, private, non-profit-distributing, self-governing, and voluntary), the
most striking difference between his ‘Western’ description and these two official
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Chinese definitions, of course is the absence of the mentioning of ‘self-
governance’ in the latter. This is the feature that says the most about the relation
between state and society, and also the one we might expect to be most important
for the degree of autonomy enjoyed by Chinese NGOs. It must be added that even
though ‘self-governance’ does not appear in the Chinese official definition, the
Ministry of Civil Affairs, since the 1990´s “has been pushing the ‘three selves of
polity’: finacially self-sufficient, self-governing, and self-recruiting” (Ma
Congress homepage). There is of course a long way from talk to action, and as Ma
Qiusha states, “how much autonomy Chinese NGOs enjoy is still the most
controversial issue” (ibid).
China´s Official Classification of NGOs
All organizations outside of the state system
Social organizations Nongovernmental & non-commercial
   (shehui tuanti, SOs) enterprises
(minban fei qiye danwei, NGNCEs)
Civil associations, chambers of
Commerce, federations, foundations, Nonprofit professional or social service
& charitable organizations providers, such as research institutions,
schools, hospitals, community based
nursing homes, and health centers
In 2000, the total number of registered
SOs nationwide was 136,841 among them In 2001, an official estimation of
over 1,200 were funding intermediaries. NGNCEs nationwide was 700,000
(although there were only 20 000 
registered with the MCA in 2000)
Figure 1. (http://www.cecc.gov)
In addition to the two categories SOs and NGNCEs, there are several other names
for organizations in China, and it is not easy to make clear between them. As
figure 2 shows, there are at least six different names distinguishing organizations.
These names are however not used consistently and are sometimes used
interchangeably, but there are still some political nuances to be aware of. First of
all, the name social organizations here should not be equated with the SOs in the
1998 regulations. As mentioned, the term ‘social organizations’ was adopted for
categorizing organizations outside of the state. Renmin tuanti (People´s
Organizations) and Qunzhong zuzhi (mass organizations) are both old names that
are however still in use. They are serving a political purpose and have through
PRC´s history provided a bridge between the CCP and the people. Many of these
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organizations existed before 1949, and were grassroots organizations fighting for
their members´ interests. Both types of organizations have close relations with the
government, even though more and more are being encouraged to become self-
sufficient. Fei zhengfu zuzhi and fei yingli zuzhi are used without consistence for
both domestic and foreign NGOs, even though the former is being avoided as a
term for domestic NGOs, since the word ‘fei’, in addition to ‘non’, also has the
meaning of ‘anti’.
Chinese Terminology of NGOs
ENGLISH TERM CHINESE
TERM
EXAMPLES OF ORGANIZATIONS
Social Organizations Shehui tuanti A general term for member-serving
associations and foundations
People´s Organizations (19 at the
national level)
Renmin tuanti “The eight big organizations”, such as:
All-China Federation of Trade Unions,
Chinese People´s Friendship Association,
All-China Federation of Returned
Overseas Chinese
Mass organizations Qunzhong zuzhi All-China Federation of Trade Unions,
Chinese Communist Youth League, All-
China Women´s Federation
Folk organizations Minjian zuzhi All-China General Chamber of Industry
and Commerce, China International
Chambers of Commerce
Nongovernmental organization
(NGOs)
Fei zhengfu zuzhi Usually referred to as foreign NGOs, but
some Chinese NGOs adopt this term
Nonprofit organization (NPOs) Fei yingli zuzhi New term for Chinese SOs and NGNCEs
Figure 2. (http://www.cecc.gov)
The two main categories for NGOs that I will use are registered NGOs (SOs and
NGNCEs registered with MCA) and government organized NGOs (GONGOs). I
will also use the term ‘unregistered NGOs’, since this represents a large and
important group.
3.2 The Emergence of NGOs
The argument for not allowing the existence of non-governmental organizations
and associations is basically that the state is the only, and sufficient, provider of
social services. When a market economy is introduced and private business and
interests are taking over, the ability of the regime to control the society however
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limits. A service gap emerges when needs for new types of services are created,
and several social services that the state used to provide are left to private
entrepreneurs. In this situation the emergence of NGOs is vital for filling this gap.
There are however many ways that NGOs can emerge. They can emerge at a state
initiative, top-down, or as genuine grass-root organizations, bottom-up. The latter
has been scarce in China for obvious reasons. In 1978 it was however decided that
the Party and the government would be distinguished from each other, and the
political reforms that were initiated ”removed the Party´s right to intervene in
social entities” (Brook 1997, p. 37f). This created some space between Party
organs and mass organizations (qunzhong tuanti), that had since 1949 been
closely linked with each other. Furthermore, the Chinese government has since
the beginning of the 1990´s been advocating the policy of ‘small government, big
society’. This emphasized the expansion of the nongovernmental sector and for
the government to “mobilize resources from within the society in order to tackle
the negative consequences of the transition from a planned to a market economy”
(Ma 2005, p. 6). The government has since then been transferring some of it´s
functions to nongovernmental organizations.
Since the reforms were initiated in 1978, a large number of NGOs have
emerged, and as mentioned there are various different types. According to official
statistics, China had 142,121 registered non-governmental organizations (local-
level social organizations) by the end of 2003, which is an increase by 6.8 % from
the year before (Lu 2005, p. 2; www.china.org.cn). In 1978 only 6000 existed.
The number of national social organizations, rose from 100 in 1978 to 1,736 in
2003. Another way to classify is to make the distinction between SOs and
NGNCEs. China did in 2001 accordingly have 129 000 organizations registered as
SOs and about 82 000 as NGNCEs (Ma 2005, p. 13). By this we can conclude that
the majority of registered NGOs are local-level SOs. As a comparison there were
officially 1500 GONGOs by the end of 1998. What this number actually refers to
is however not clear, and it is probable that it does not include any of the
organizations registered with the MCA. The actual number may thus be much
higher if we count all organizations that are strongly related to the state. The
number of unregistered NGOs was, by NPO Network, estimated to 2000 000.
(www.usembassy-china.org.cn)
By any standards, the number of NGOs has grown dramatically (both the
national and the local social organizations). Some emerge as ’genuine’ NGOs, and
others are more or less government organized NGOs.
3.3 Problems Facing Chinese NGOs
The major concern for the government is to prevent the emergence of autonomous
NGOs that might challenge the authority of the CCP. As a result, the
government´s attitude  towards the NGO sector is somewhat inconsistent. On the
one hand they are working to promote the emergence of NGOs, and on the other
hand they are adopting measures to control them.
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There are today a number of factors that are hindering the development of NGOs,
and, for those that exist, from effectively performing public-benefit functions. To
begin with, the Tiananmen incident of 1989 made the Chinese regime regulate to
control the operation and activities of NGOs. Most important is the procedure of
registration, which requires all NGOs to have a government line agency as their
sponsoring agency for two years, before being legally registered at the MCA. The
sponsoring agency is responsible for ”supervising the NGOs day-to-day activities
and for annually reviewing the work of its affiliated NGOs” (Zhang 2003, s. 11).
This is of course posing an enormous obstacle in the way of NGOs trying to work
in more politically sensitive areas. The difficulty of finding an official sponsor, in
China popularly referred to as the ‘mother in law’, drives many NGOs to register
as businesses with the Bureau of Industry and Commerce in order to have a legal
identity. (www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com). If there is, as I hypothesized, a
larger space for autonomy in the profit oriented field, one might also assume that
there is a large amount of organizations that are able to carry out NGO functions
while being registered as businesses.
Another impediment for setting up an NGO in China is a law stating that an
NGO applying to register as a national organization must have start-up funds of at
least 100 000 RMB (12 000 US$ in 2005), while regional organizations must have
funds of at least 30 000 RMB (3600 US$ in 2005). Most problematic is the fact
that they are not allowed to raise any funds until their application is accepted.
The emergence of the Falun Gong Movement also made the regime adopt
further measures to control the development of NGOs. For example, it was
stipulated that ”no NGO set up by ‘specific social groups’, such as migrant
laborers, laid off workers, or ex-servicemen, should be allowed to exist” (Lu
2005, p. 2). The measures also include the preventing of NGOs from growing to
big by prohibiting them from establishing regional branches (ibid.). Limiting the
diversity of the NGO sector is also the fact that “only one NGO of one type is
allowed to register at each administrative level (Ma 2005, p. 9). All these
regulations are of course posing enormous constraints on the NGOs, and also tie
them to the government. It is a fact that many Chinese foundations, trade
associations, and professional associations that are registered as NGOs are in fact
organized by the government (GONGOs) or closely tied to it. Ma Qiusha
interviewed a high official in MCA in 1996, who admitted that ”less than 50% of
Social Organizations were self-organized, self-supported, and self-governed” (Ma
2002, p. 306). Others are even less optimistic. Julie Fisher, with her emphasis on
organizational autonomy, says that China may only have a handful of genuine
NGOs (Fisher 1998, p. 48).
Another problem with the organizations registered with MCA, is that the
majority of them are academic ones, making up slightly more than a third.
Another third are industry associations, and the remaining one-third are ”the likes
of public welfare and friendship organizations” (www.icnl.org). A survey that was
conducted in 2000, by the NGO Research Center of Qinghua University in
Beijing, shows that the proportion of NGOs in the field of charity and aid to
vulnerable groups is to small. There are only 1.45 NGOs for every 10,000
Chinese, ”which is a lot less than in developed countries, or in some developing
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countries such as India and Brazil” (www.china.org.cn). There is also a problem
with funding and attracting competent personnel, which these types of
organizations are particularly exposed to.
The funding problem is a growing problem for many NGOs, especially for
those that were earlier sponsored by the government. The government put in 2002
a three-year deadline for trade associations to become self-sufficient (Ma 2002, p.
315). Further adding to the difficulties with funding is the fact that there is no aid
and donation culture in Chinese society today and that the tax and donation laws
provide little incentive for contributions to NGOs. The public image of NGOs, as
well as the confidence of donors, has also been hurt by corruption and a series of
scandals in the NGO community. So, poor accountability might be an important
factor damaging the NGOs channels for funding. A Chinese survey actually found
out that “a large percentage of urban citizens would want to donate funds to
address various kinds of societal needs, but their major concern is the lack of
proper channels and the absence of accountability of those who handle the
donations” (Ye 2003, p. 20). As will be further elaborated on later on, the problem
with funding is double-egged, and could be viewed both as favoring and working
against the gaining of autonomy for NGOs.
Since there are a great number of foreign NGOs working in China (including
the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Amity Foundation, and
Save the Children), one might perhaps ask if there is the risk that the international
donor community is creating an artificial civil society, and that the only real
bottom-up NGOs are foreign. Patrice McMahon argues that international actors
”failed to foster a domestic advocacy network” in East Central Europe, and that
they may actually have ”hindered the success of the very goals they pursued”
(McMahon 2004, p. 250f). In China, however, the number of domestic
organizations is much greater, even at the grass-root level, and it seems unlikely
that the third sector would be purely artificial.
Then there is of course the question of uneven development of  civil society.
The growth of NGOs is mainly taking place in the urban areas, and especially in
the large cities along the eastern coast and the Yangzi River. In addition, it is the
already empowered groups in society that have the best chances of  making their
voices heard. The problem of an ’elite’ civil society is however not a specific
Chinese one, but a global one.
A brief summary of the main problems facing Chinese NGOs today could look
like this:
1 .  Registration: a) the demands for a sponsor agency and the two-year
evaluation period; b) not all groups of people are allowed to start an NGO;
c) citizens who want to found an NGO have to have some significant
personal resources before hand.
2. Uneven development of NGOs: a) geographical – development is mainly
taking place along the eastern coast and the Yangzi River; b) social – NGO
development favors already empowered elites; c) diversity – e.g. there are
to few NGOs involved in charity and aid (and naturally also in the political
field).
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3. Constraints on the development in size of NGOs.
4. Poor accountability
5. Funding: problems with funding when organizations get no state funding,
as well as unclear or unfavorable tax and donation laws.
Two of these problems are directly affecting the space for autonomy for NGOs:
the demands for a sponsor agency and problems with the funding. These problems
will be discussed more in depth later on.
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4 Analysis
4.1 Examples of Chinese NGOs
It is not very hard to determine whether or not an NGO is registered. It is however
a much more difficult task to decide the degree of autonomy that Chinese NGOs
enjoy. Here, I will be presenting a number of examples of Chinese NGOs, and
onto these apply some of the theories outlined in the beginning of this work.
I will begin with a discussion of the government organized NGOs and see if
they are completely tied to the government and if there may be a variety within
this group. I will however mainly focus on the NGOs registered with MCA. In a
third part I will discuss unregistered organizations, working in the political field,
and present some examples of this.
4.1.1 Government Organized NGOs
The reason for including a discussion of government organized NGOs is to show
how even here there is a gradual shift from state-dependency towards self-
governance and autonomy, and that some organizations go all the way from being
state-initiated and state-controlled to becoming ‘genuine’ NGOs.
Since the reforms started and the need for a private voluntary sector was
recognized, the government and party departments have been setting up
nongovernmental organizations, by some observers labeled GONGOs. There are
three main reasons for the creation of GONGOs. Firstly, the participation of
NGOs in development projects has “made it easier for the Chinese government to
obtain funding and technical assistance from multilateral, bilateral or international
sources” (Ma 2005, p. 11). Secondly, GONGOs have the role of relieving the
social consequences of the transition to a market economy, and thirdly, they help
to absorb the large group of former government employees who have lost their
jobs due to the economic reforms (ibid). Although GONGOs were set up by the
government there is evidence that they are becoming increasingly autonomous.
The All-China Lawyers´Associations (ACLA) is an association that has
emerged as result of the market reforms and the opening up to the world, and has
an important role to play in a new system based on the rule of law. It “operates a
code of conduct, provides professional training for it´s members, and attempts to
delineate and protect their rights” (White et al. 1996, p. 107). It is a semi-official
association, and could by no means be classified as an NGO. It receives state
funding, has a quota staff from the government, and it is required for all lawyers
to join the association. Still, the association has taken steps towards financial
independence, e.g. by establishing it´s own law firm in 1993, and it´s members
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were “gaining greater independence by setting up private or quasi-private
partnership-based law firms outside government service” (ibid).
In the rapid growth of the security industry, the Chinese Securities Industry
Association was founded in 1991, as a result of the pressure on the government
from companies wanting to protect their interest securities. The organization was
thus an outcome of both a push from below and support from above (ibid: p. 110).
The tasks of the association include the monitoring of members´ behavior,
regulation of qualifications, and the enforcement of a professional code of
conduct. The associations sources of revenues are “diverse and diversifying”, and
officials of that association expected it to achieve more independence and greater
institutional importance in the future (ibid).
The China Association of Science and Technology (CAST) is an official social
organization that is becoming more and more autonomous from the state. Just as
with other official social organizations, the CAST is not required to register with
the MCA, and does therefore not have a supervisory agency. On the contrary,
other associations wish to attach themselves to it to gain prestige and support.
CAST actually describes itself as a non-profit nongovernmental organization
(http://english.cast.org.cn), but it´s relation to the government is simply too close
for any observers to agree with this. However, as the government is becoming
more reluctant to provide funds, CAST has sought out new ways of generating
money, including raising revenues from it´s real estate and even developing
profit-making entities. As a consequence, officials of CAST have expressed a
desire for their relationship with the government to become looser (White et al.
1996, p. 108). The organization sees as one of it´s main tasks to ”provide policy
advice and other services to the government” (http://english.cast.org.cn). If CAST
in the future aquire a certain amount of autonomy from the government, it will
result in a healthy dynamic where it is supporting and helping in training
government personell. The organization will thus build up a, as Julie Fishers calls
it, ”staff experience in training government workers”, and accordingly also it´s
organizational autonomy.
It might at first appear as if though the only autonomy gained by these
organizations is a financial one as the government is cutting of funding. But, there
is also a change taking place in these organizations´ images of themselves and of
their role in society. As Nick Young, editor of China Development Brief, points
out “many of these organizations are steadily acquiring a more independent
identity, and developing a sense of themselves as belonging to a distinctive, non-
government community” (http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com). They are,
with Fisher´s words, building up an organizational commitment to autonomy.
Young also states that there seems to be a significant government intent to
rationalize the NGO sector. “Many SONGOs (state-owned NGOs - a term used by
Young for GONGOs; writer´s note) themselves have made significant progress
towards financial transparency (for example, through the publishing of audited
accounts), improved governance (through the appointment of management boards
and grants approval committees), and improved professional standards (through
various efforts to train staff in NGO management)” (ibid). Young sees a clear
tendency for these organizations to emphasize their non-profit and non-
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government identity, and believes this to reflect a gradual evolution of some of
these organizations into more independent social actors (ibid). A change in the
organizational culture of the NGO sector will prove to be essential in the future
development of autonomous and self-governing organizations.
Wu Fengshi discusses environmental GONGOs and describes how many of
these organizations, that were originally set up by the government, are gaining
greater organizational autonomy (Wu 2003, p. 41). His keys to organizational
autonomy include legal status, financial and personnel resources, capacity
building abilities, and access to international sources. He argues that the
withdrawal of state funding is forcing GONGOs to seek support elsewhere,
mostly abroad. In order to have a standing chance in this struggle over
international donors, they have to expand their own level of capacity. With higher
capacity levels “they can develop their own expertise, expand their activity scope,
and gradually obtain more autonomy from the government” (ibid: p. 42). Wu
points out the examples with the Beijing Energy Efficiency Center (BECon) and
the Chinese Renewable Energy Industry Association (CREIA), and how they have
become more independent in decision-making and project implementation. He
states that ”the evolution in their organizational ideologies, the scope of their
activities, and the recognition they have obtained from both insiders and outsiders
have gone far beyond what the state ever intended” (ibid: p. 40).
4.1.2 Registered NGOs
Many of the organizations that do manage to register are founded by influential
and relatively wealthy individuals, and do also have a strong governmental
backing.
One such NGO is the China Youth Development Foundation (CYDF), which
was founded in 1989 as a nonprofit social organization, by Xu Yongguang who
along with several other officials resigned from the government-controlled CCYL.
The CYDF is one of China´s more well-known NGOs and has the aim of
improving the health and well-being of Chinese youth. In 1989 it initiated the
Hope Project which has often been recognized as the most successful single
nongovernmental project in China. The project encouraged millions of common
people to get involved, and between 1989 and 1996 it received donations from
China and abroad totaling about 100,000,000 US$ (Ma 2002b, p. 126). A national
survey of more than 30,000 young people in 20 provinces, found in 1996 that
more than 73% had donated money to the Hope Project (ibid). This would negate
the claim that there is no philanthropic culture in China, or at least suggest that
there is a developing such culture. Not all observers are however as optimistic
about the CYDF and it´s independence from the government. Michael Frolic
points out that the CYDF is controlled by the All-China Youth Federation, one of
China´s oldest “Communist Party front organizations” (Frolic 1997, p. 61).
Although he recognizes the value and importance of the work of the organization,
he considers the CYDF to be nothing more than a good example of state-led civil
society. China Charity Foundation (CCF) on the other hand provides us,
according to Frolic, with a more encouraging example. He points out that
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“substantial numbers of citizens as well as influential foreigners, who are
contributing funds, are actively involved in the CCF´s work (ibid). This allows for
a greater degree of transparency and holds the NGO accountable to its
constituents. In this process, one might expect the organization to gain some
autonomy from the government.
There are also examples of how organizations that are registered with the
Bureau of Industry and Commerce (which we earlier discarded as for-profit
organizations) as enterprises have actually developed into NGOs and become
more autonomous. Global Village of Beijing, an example of this kind of
organization, is working hard to raise public awareness on environmental
protection issues. ”It has produced a series of environmental education TV
programs, and has also (…) reached out to college students to organize volunteers
for environmental protection projects.” (Zhang 2003, p. 14). It also emphasizes
the importance of autonomy, and e.g. states that “funds are used to (…) help
nurture civil society through increased autonomy and decision-making at the
village level” (www.gvbchina.org). The organization also fulfils Fisher´s demand
for financial diversification, and receives funding from many different public
foundations, trusts, individuals and development organizations (see
www.gvbchina.org).
In order to make their organizations more efficient than the governmental
institutions, many NGOs have introduced market mechanisms into these nonprofit
organizations. Hetong Home for the Elderly in Tianjin is an example of this.
Hetong is, with it´s 500 beds, the largest private nonprofit nursing home in China.
State-owned or private for-profit institutions constitute the majority in the highly
competitive eldercare market, and in order to survive, Hetong has focused on
increasing efficiency while reducing costs. At present, ”the cost per bed in Hetong
is only 28% to 33% of the cost in state institutions. Meanwhile, the quality of
Hetong´s service is much better than the service in private institutions that care
only about profit” (Ma 2002a, p. 321). The registration of profit-oriented
organizations, such as private nursing homes and childcare institutions, has been
made possible by loopholes in the government´s NGO management system (Lu
2005, p. 5). Many would immediately disqualify these types of organizations for
being profit-oriented, but on the other hand they are still beneficial to society and
are ultimately driven by a philanthropic ambition.
An example of a ’hybrid organization’ is the Rural Women Knowing All
(RWKA) that was founded in 1993. It is working to ”empower and create more
opportunities for rural Chinese women, particularly those who are poverty-
stricken” (www.suscom-maine.net). This organization operates several programs
to help rural women to become independent mentally and financially, such as
providing small loans, literacy classes, counseling, and hotline services. It also
publishes a magazine, the only one in China targeting this audience, that
disseminates knowledge about women´s rights, market information and
agricultural technology. (Zhang 2003, p. 14). RWKA is afilliated with the Women
of China Newspaper, which is registered as a for-profit entity, while itself is best
described as a grass-root organization. We thus see how organizations may be of
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many different types, how they can move from one to another, and also how they
gain autonomy by doing so.
4.1.3 Unregistered NGOs
As a result of the difficulties with registering, leaders of NGOs have found other
ways of establishing their organization. Some use the tactic of registering as a for-
profit organization with the Bureau of Industry and Commerce, while others
choose to become secondary organizations affiliated with e.g. universities,
instituttions, and commercial enterprises. This is a loophole in the registration law
which saves them the trouble of registering. There is however also a large group
that choose to not register at all. As mentioned, this is by far the largest group of
NGOs, and they often take the shape of ‘salons’ and ‘clubs’ (Ma 2005, p. 14).
Since they are not registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, they are in
principle illegal. The majority of these can however work without interference or
restrictions from the government. Of course the extent to which an unregistered
NGO is spared from repression ultimately is decided by the area in which it is
working. Consequently, there are not many NGOs that work in politically
sensitive areas such as human rights, religion and labor.
One of the most obvious political organizations to emerge in the 1990´s was
the China Democratic Party (CDP). It was founded by the former imprisoned
student leader Wang Youcai during the relative political loosening in the late
1990´s and in connection with Bill Clinton´s China visit in 1998. Wang and
several dissident colleagues quickly built up a network that encompassed eight
provinces. Their tactic relied on the emphasis on peaceful methods and the
establishment of preparatory party branches. In China´s 1982 constitution the
right to form political parties is guaranteed (Gries & Rosen 2004, p. 127), but
there are no clear legal procedures for the establishment of this kind of
organization. As a result, the CDP received mixed messages when the party
branches all over the country tried to apply to register at the local authorities. The
CDP was allowed to exist for six months before they employed a more aggressive
tactic and omitted the word preparatory from their name, thus implying that they
were already an established party, and the government started arresting the
leaders. Still, the government “refrained from outright suppression as long as the
group engaged in moderate activities that followed legal procedures” (ibid: p.
137). Overall, the experience of the CDP “illustrate that the CCP is far from
monolithic, and that autonomous groups can, and do, successfully exploit
openings created by decentralized rule and conflicting official interests” (ibid: p.
125).
Other well-known organizations that work in politically sensitive areas are e.g.
Human Rights in China (HRIC), the Tiananmen Mothers and the China Labor
Bulletin (CLB). The latter emerged during the same time as the CDP, but has
chosen a more modest way in their work. They promote ”independent, democratic
union organizing, and the protection of labour rights and standards in mainland
China” (http://www.china-labour.org). Robin Munro, research director of the CLB
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said in an interview this year that they´ve recently started a new ’case intervention
program’, where the organization provides legal help for workers in China. In one
recent case, where some workers were arrested and tried in Suizhou city, in Hubei
province, the defendants were either freed or sentenced very lightly as a result of
their lawyer's work. In another case nine workers from the Taiwanese Stella shoe
factory were detained. Munro calls this a ”milestone event in Chinese labor
history”, since their lawyers managed to effectively put the Stella company
against the wall, on account of the company's ”abusive employment practices”
(http://www.wmd.org). Teresa Wright means that it is the ”consistent promotion
of legal and orderly worker actions” that have made the CLB remain active for so
long without any harassment or repression (Wright 2004, p. 136). There is in fact
some evidence that a seed to a working-class movement might be growing in
China. About a month ago, 10 000 strikers at a Japanese-owned factory in
Shenzhen, on the border of Hong Kong won the right to form a union. Workers do
have a legal right to form a branch of the state union (All-China Federation of
Trade Unions, ACFTU), but the law has not been upheld since the government
doesn´t want to scare of foreign investors. The factory, belonging to the Japanese
Uniden, is a subcontractor to the American Wal-Mart, which has continuously
pressured the ACFTU to allow the formation of unions on their factories (Wong,
Sydsvenskan, 050426). There hasn´t been any changes for the workers at the
Uniden factory yet, but the victory itself proves that the process of globalization
and pressure from the outside world is forcing the Chinese government to let go of
some of it´s control, and allow for actors and organizations outside of the state
realm to gain in autonomy.
4.2 Analysis
4.2.1 The Autonomy of Chinese NGOs
Here follows a brief summary of the facts favoring respectively hindering the
gaining of autonomy of NGOs:
Autonomy (+):
1. Funding: a) The government is gradually withdrawing it´s funding of NGOs; b)
increasing possibilities for ‘financial diversity’
2. Strengthening of the rule of law
3. Increasing organizational commitment to autonomy and a change in the self-
image of NGOs
Autonomy (-):
1. Registration: All NGOs are required to have a government line agency as their
sponsoring agency, before being legally registered at the MCA.
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2. Ambiguous government attitude towards NGOs and random crack-downs on
politically oriented organizations.
3.Weak philanthropic tradition
When it comes to political and ideological matters, in the end Chinese
organizations can´t make their own decisions. In this sense, we might say that no
NGO in China could be completely autonomous. Still we must, as Ma Qiusha
points out, “recognize the significant gap between the rhetoric of the party-state´s
intention and what actually can be enforced by the government”
(http://www.cecc.gov). The government have been continuously taking measures
for controling the emergence of nongovernmental organizations. The regulations
for registration and the system with a sponsor agency have worked as effective
mechanisms for controling and limiting the emergence of unwanted organizations.
At the same time there seems to exist a greater space for autonomy than is
actually used. Agencies charged with monitoring NGO activity are seriously
understaffed and simply do not have the possibilities of evaluating the
organizations they were supervising. The staff at the MCA´s Popular Organization
Management Bureau (POMB), one Chinese researcher remarked, “did not even
have the time to read the annual reports of all the NGOs under their supervision,
let alone effectively monitor and review their activities. The situation at provincial
and lower levels was similar or even worse” (Lu 2005, p. 3).
We´ll continue by looking at the issue with financing. The lack of funding,
both from the Chinese state and the Chinese society, is one of the main problem
that NGOs in China face today. But it represents at the same time great
possibilities. As a result of the state withdrawal from the NGO arena,  80% to
90% of Chinese NGO funding is today coming from international sources (Ma
2005, p. 19). One might ask if there is the risk that Chinese NGOs are simply
going from one master to another, when they are becoming financially dependent
of international donors instead of the Chinese government. Thereby no autonomy
would be gained. It must however be said that this is a global problem and not a
mere Chinese one. If an NGO is dependent of one single donor it is a problem, but
when they are getting their funding from several different places is in fact
ensuring more autonomy in their operation. Since 1992 NGOs are also allowed to
set up their own enterprises, which allows for NGOs to “increase their financial
base and secure greater operational autonomy” (White et al. 1996, p. 105). It is
however true that the withdrawal of state funding does not immediately lead to
full autonomy for an organization. Some organizations that find no new channels
of revenues will simply vanish. Returning to Fishers second key to autonomy, that
of financial diversification, we can see that there is a problem. Organizations are
often depending only on a few sources for funding and might be improperly
influenced by dominant donors. For example in the the international case with
Kenya, where the Voluntary Agencies Development Assistance (VADA) was too
closely tied to both the USAID and the Kenyan government. As a result, VADA
“undercut it´s own organizing ability by accepting USAID´s goals rather than
defining it´s own” (Fisher 1998, p. 79). Furthermore, it should be noted that state
funding is not per se a bad thing, only when it restricts and shapes the
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organization. Leaders of Chinese organizations sometimes insist they are NGOs
because they are free from government funding, and “do not realize that NGOs in
many countries receive large amounts of government funds” (Ma 2002, p. 310). It
is however my belief that the withdrawal of government funding represents a
delinking from the state that is more beneficial for the development of autonomy
and pluralism in China, than the possible new dependency of other single donors
is bad.
There seems to be a change ocurring in the organizational culture in China. As
mentioned earlier, there are many observers pointing to the difference in the way
NGOs in China and elsewhere view themselves and their role in society. Looking
at the different cases I´ve described, it seems to be a general trend of an increasing
organizational commitment to autonomy as NGO leaders today are emphasizing
their independency and autonomy as service providers in society. This is an
essential step on the road towards organizational autonomy. Returning to another
of Fisher´s criteria, that of ‘staff experience in training government personell’,
there are no evidence to suggest such a trend, but this will however be a natural
developemnt when organizations are becoming more separated from the state.
China is gradually establishing a system based on the rule of law. This is
strengthening the autonomy of NGOs, and is in the long run the key factor for
NGOs to become fully autonomous. For this to happen the CCP must of course let
go of some of it´s power and allow for the society to counter-monitor it. Still, it´s
a fact that Chinese citizens for the first time in China´s history can sue
government officials. And it´s not just pretty words, but the actual number of
lawsuits against government officials has increased a lot, and “reliance on
lawsuits and judicial processes has reached a level that surprises many observers”
(Balzer 2004, p. 241). Minxin Pei finds that from 1988 to 1996, the number of
lawsuits filed against violations of property and personal rights tripled, from 2,434
to 7,467 (Yang 2003, p. 11). He attributes this growing ‘right consciousness’ to
several interrelated factors such as “a decline in repression, constraints on the
leadership stemming from increased participation in international organizations
and commitments to international norms, and legal reforms within China” (Balzer
2004, p. 241). Allthough the number of law cases that actually reach court might
still be very small, this growing resort to the legal system must be seen as
something inherently good and something that is vital for the fostering of a system
based on the rule of law . As Zhang Ye points out, as society becomes more open,
“a middle class with more education and stronger economic base is emerging,
claiming citizens´ right and trying to assert itself in the policy-making process”
(Zhang 2003, p. 10).
4.2.2 What civil society functions can Chinese NGOs carry out?
In some areas NGOs in China can carry out civil society functions in the same
degree as NGOs in democratic countries. Just because NGOs are carrying out
functions that are also approved and wanted by the government, it does not mean
that they are  not beneficial to the Chinese society. In  this sense Chinese NGOs
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are capable of carrying out functions that are normally attributed to a civil society.
Of course, another problem might be that they often do not have the
organizational capacity and service provision effectiveness needed to perform
well, but to evaluate the quality of the services provided by the NGOs goes
outside of the purpose of this study. We can thus draw the conclusion that NGOs
do not need the same amount of autonomy to carry out the first of the two civil
society functions, being beneficial to the public, as they have to be in order to
monitor the state.
Returning to Julie Fisher and her outline of an oppositional relationship
betweeen autonomy and accountability, the NGO situation in China could be
characterized as the least wanted. There is a poor accountability downwards (and
a rather strong upwards) and little autonomy upwards (much autonomy
downwards). This means that the government has a good control on NGOs, while
the constituents have little insight and influence over the same organizations. This
situation is, as already mentioned, negatively affecting the public image of NGOs.
In a country where philanthropic traditions are weak and the state is in retreat, an
expanding NGO sector is heavily dependent on the benevolence of the public. A
positive development would in this regard bring the organizations closer to it´s
constituents, and thereby securing the financial viability as well as improving the
organizational capacity of NGOs. However, While there, according to my
research, is a change taking place regarding the self-image of NGOs, there are no
evidence of an equivalent development ocurring among the public (even though
the Hope Project is encouraging). On the other hand it seems likey that such a
development will occur in the near future, since NGOs are becoming increasingly
dependent on the public. NGOs will in this process gain autonomy from the
government, while the organizations themselves become accountable to the
public. Such a development will in combination with a strengthening of the rule of
law allow for NGOs to counter-monitor the state and it´s activities.
NGOs do today not have the ability to monitor the state, and can thus not carry
out the, by many observers considered to be, most important civil society
function.
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5. Conclusions
This paper has been able to offer only a schematic overview of the development
of NGOs and civil society in China. I still, however, claim that there is a clear
tendency of a development towards a more pluralistic society, and that the
Chinese society is becoming a fertile ground for NGOs that are becoming more
and more autonomous in relation to the state. The Chinese society with it´s
expanding market, private interests and entrepreneurs, is simply becoming to big
for the regime to monitor and control. But this development is not without
question marks. The fact that more and more NGOs (GONGOs and registered) are
becoming financially independent from the government, I have argued, is a
mainly positive development. Still, even though NGOs do not receive any funding
from the government, they are still dependent on it for their ability to operate. In
this sense, the existense of an organization is ultimately in the hands of the
government, and thus no autonomy could exist. On the other hand the government
does not have the capability to monitor the activities of all NGOs in China. They
do however effectively still screen out all to the regime potentially dangerous
organizations, normally those belonging to what we at the beginning branded as
‘political civil society’.
When defining civil society, many scholars, such as White, Diamond, and
Schmitter (He 1997, p. 14f), all emphasize political civil society and the
democratic functions that it is supposed to have. A narrow concept of civil society
like this has proven to be fruitless in any attempt to discuss the case of China.
Organizations in China do today simply not have the autonomy or ability to
monitor the state and it´s activities to a satisfiable extent. The state is much too in
control for this to occur. There seems however to exist a larger space for
autonomy than is actually used. Furthermore, even though the society-centered
Western concept of civil society might not be applicable to the case of China
today, does not mean that it will not be useful in the future. China does today not
have a civil society, at least not in the Western political sense, but the infra
structure is being laid.
The results so far might seem contradictive; a state in retreat, but still very
much in control. Harley Balzer refer to this as ‘managed pluralism’, a system
where the government simultaneously encourage and place limits on cultural and
political diversity (Balzer 2004, p. 238). There is a struggle going on between the
state and the society, and it is, in my view, the latter that has got the upperhand.
Allthough I won´t make any predictions about the future of democracy in
China, it should be noted that the probability of Chinese civil society and NGOs
alone to create a democratic transition is rather small. As Gideon Baker points
out, referring to the case of East Europe, ”the civil society project present before
transition occurred could not, of itself, create a democratic society in the absence
of  ’official institutions’ and ’legal rules of the game’” (Baker 2004, p. 45). The
changes in China are however more gradual than those in East Europe, and NGOs
might over a longer period of time improve China´s regulatory framework, and
move their operation into more politically sensitive areas.
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In monitoring this development, further research would be most useful
conducting case studies of Chinese NGOs, the degree of autonomy they enjoy,
and their strategies for counter-monitoring the state.
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